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The paper considers the extent of the American pre-emptive strike doctrine. It ex-
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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The rule prohibiting the use of force is an imperative norm of international 
law. The permitted exceptions to the rule are the right of self-defence and the use 
of force with the approval of the UN Security Council.
Although Articles 2, 4 and 51 of the UN Charter, as well as general custom-
ary law, prohibit preventive actions in principle, a pre-emptive strike against an 
imminent attack may be subsequently approved by the Security Council as self-
defence. This option is provided by the Definition of Aggression adopted within 
the UN framework, by UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974.1 Namely, Article 2 of the Definition provides that the first use 
of armed force shall constitute prima facie (i.e. rebuttable) evidence of an act of 
aggression, although the Security Council may conclude that such a determina-
tion would not be justified in the light of other circumstances. Therefore, for in-
stance, the Security Council may conclude that the first use of armed force was in 
fact prevention against the imminent aggression for the purposes of self-defence 
(the so-called pre-emptive strike). 
However, the possibility of a pre-emptive strike is rather limited and is to be 
considered in the light of circumstances determined in a famous Caroline case in 
1837. Below we consider the mentioned case and the characteristics of the new 
American pre-emptive strike doctrine, as well as its impact on international law.
1 For Croatian translation see D. Lapaš, T. M. Šošić (ed.), Međunarodno javno pravo – izbor 
dokumenata, Zagreb 2005.
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2. PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE LEGITIMACY ACCORDING TO CUSTOMARY LAW
The pre-emptive strike legitimacy according to customary law was laid down 
in the Caroline case in 1837. The Caroline was an American steamboat that was 
transporting supplies of people and provisions from the USA to the rebels against 
the British rule in Canada. The British forces attacked the ship in the Ameri-
can territory to prevent the rebels’ strike, claiming it was in self-defence. The 
American side asked the British to prove that the necessity of that self-defence 
was instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation. Moreover, the act justified by the necessity of self-defence must 
be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it,2 argued the American 
side and demanded the British proved their action was in conformity with these 
requirements, as well. 
As put forward by Christine Gray, the Caroline case attained a “mythical 
authority”,3 because it first defined the legitimacy of the use of force in anticipa-
tion of the coming attack. It defined the imminent danger (the attack), but also the 
requirement that the use of force be necessary and proportional to a coming attack. 
In other words, it was emphasized that the use of force must not be punitive. 
Any expansion of the right of self defence outside the framework of the for-
mula provided by the Caroline case would be legally impermissible.
A large majority of countries have retained the narrow interpretation of self-
defence. However, even prior to the terrorist attacks on the USA in 2001 some 
countries used to refer to the broad interpretation of the right of self defence, 
comprising the protection of fellow citizens in a foreign territory, the broad right 
of anticipatory self defence and the use of force to counter terrorist attacks. Be-
sides the US and Israeli actions, we can also recall e.g. the South African and 
Portuguese actions in the 1960s and the 1970s.4
Although they claimed self defence, the actions of some of the afore men-
tioned countries would more properly be considered as reprisals. Namely, in 
some cases the countries would use the term self-defence to refer to their armed 
response to past terrorist attacks, aimed to deter future attacks.
2 In 1841, writing about the attack on the Caroline steamboat,  American Secretary General 
Daniel Webster stated that it would be for the British side to show that: ″[...] necessity of 
self-defence ... /was/ instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation ... Even supposing the need to enter the territory of the US, Britain must show it 
did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self defence 
must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it …” See also A. D. Soafer, “On the 
Necessity of Pre-emption”, European Journal of International Law (hereinafter: EJIL), 2003, 
Vol. 14, p. 214 et seq, J. C. Yoo, “Using Force”, University of Chicago Law Review 2004, Vol. 
71, pp. 8-9, and Andrassy, Međunarodno pravo, Zagreb, 1990, p. 362.
3 C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, Second edition, Oxford, New York, 2004, p. 
120.
4 For more see ibid, pp. 111-114 et seq.
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3. AMERICAN DOCTRINES
During President Clinton’s mandate, particularly after the American missile 
attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, in response to the bombing 
of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania the same year, a new doctrine 
emerged in American literature, frequently referred to as the Clinton Doctrine. Its 
tenets did not comply with current international law that recognizes self-defence 
as the sole exception to the prohibition of the unilateral use of force. As one of its 
principles when recalling the above-mentioned doctrines, scholars would men-
tion e.g. any form of the use of force to protect the vital US interests.5
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 the USA particularly pro-
moted a wide concept of self-defence, which implies a large range of pre-emptive 
actions. In that respect, it is important to mention The National Security Strategy 
of 2002,6 drawn up in response to terrorist threats. In the introductory letter 
President Bush puts forward how the threats to the US security have changed dra-
matically. In contrast to enemies in the past, terrorists may penetrate open societ-
ies and use modern technology to bring chaos.7 The USA, although constantly 
striving to enlist the support of the international community, will not hesitate to 
act alone if necessary, in order to exercise the right of self defence by acting pre-
emptively.8
The Strategy indirectly refers to the pre-emptive self-defence requirements as 
established in the Carolina case, but at the same time also distances itself there-
from. It puts forward the following:
“Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legacy of pre-
emption on the existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible mobilization 
of armies, navies and air forces preparing an attack. We must adapt the concept 
of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries […] 
The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction – and the more compelling 
the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty 
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”9
5 For more details see D. Lapaš, Sankcija u međunarodnom pravu, Zagreb, 2004, pp. 314-315 et seq.
6 See the text on www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
7 “Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the 
Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed 
great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of 
individuals bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a sin-
gle tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern 
technologies against us.” Ibid.
8 “While the US will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we 
will not hesitate to act alone if necessary, to exercise our right of self defence by acting pre-
emptively […]” Ibid.
9 Ibid, Part V.
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From subsequent speeches of President Bush it is also evident that he de facto 
advocates an unlimited right of anticipatory action, even for emerging threats to 
the USA or its allies that cannot be eliminated without the use of force.10 It will be 
too late to wait for the imminent threat, since terrorists and tyrants do not kindly 
announce their strikes, says Bush.
In the opinion of Bush and supporters of the new American doctrine, often 
referred to as the Bush Doctrine, characteristics, destructiveness and availability 
of modern weapons and changes in the type of threat to the international system, 
from irresponsible governments to terrorists in the possession of nuclear weapons 
have not brought about adequate legal changes.11 They argue that the security 
system established by the UN Charter has completely failed and that new solu-
tions are to be found, including pre-emptive strikes.
With a view to the above mentioned tenets of the new American doctrine, 
the collective security system as established by the UN Charter, which has never 
been particularly successful, has admittedly been severely endangered recently.12 
It was caused by unilateral actions of the most powerful country and its allies, 
who bypasssed the UN to counter new threats properly detected by the Strategy, 
but without any provision of adequate response thereto.
However, it should be pointed out that unilateral actions of countries in con-
formity with the new American doctrine of pre-emptive strike have not managed 
to change current international law, because the practice has remained limited to 
10 See for instance State of the Union Address of 2003, Part 8: “[…] Some have said we must not 
act until the threat is imminent. Since we have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, 
politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly 
emerge, all actions, all words and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the san-
ity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option […]” www.cnn.
com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/28/sotu.transcript.8/index.html.
11 Comp. Part V of the Strategy, o.c.: “The targets of these attacks are our military forces and 
our civilian population […] As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass 
civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorist and these losses would be exponentially 
more severe if terrorists acquired  and used weapons of mass destruction. The United States 
has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our 
national security […] To forestall or prevent such hostile act by our adversaries, the United 
States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively. The United States will not use force in all cases to 
pre-empt emerging threats, nor should nations use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression. Yet 
in an age when the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destruc-
tive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather […] The purpose 
of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and 
friends.”
12 See invaluable analyses of the collective security system by a renowned American author T. 
M. Franck: “Who killed Article 2(4)?:Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by 
States”, American Journal of International Law (hereinafter: AJIL), 1970, Vol. 64, pp. 809, 
836; Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks, Cambridge 2002; 
“What happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq”, AJIL 2003, Vol. 97, pp. 607, 610.
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a few countries, and opinion juris has not started to develop yet. A large majority 
of countries have retained the traditional narrow interpretation of the right of self 
defence.
After the intervention in Afghanistan subsequent to the terrorist attacks on the 
USA in September 2001, the silence of countries could rather have been inter-
preted as astonishment and bewilderment, than as an approval. And a majority of 
countries who gave their approval for the “war” against terrorism tried to avoid 
principal statements about international legitimacy of such an intervention.13 Af-
ter the attack on Iraq in 2003, many countries were not silent any longer, but 
openly condemned the attack. Even UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared 
before and after the Iraqi intervention that it was not in conformity with the UN 
Charter.14
4. FINAL REMARKS
Although there are no indications about new customary law regarding le-
gitimacy of pre-emptive strikes, advocated by the new American doctrine, the 
actions undertaken in conformity with this doctrine have been most detrimental 
to the UN, which has been completely marginalized. In fact, the UN has a sole 
competence to address the terrorist threat, because only an organization that in-
cludes (almost) all world countries may adequately respond to such a threat.
The prohibition on the use of force according to international law – regard-
less of its violations – is one of the greatest achievements of civilization. The 
acceptance of the new American theory of pre-emptive strikes would result in 
abrogation of the current prohibition on the use of force, which is impermissible. 
If international law is to be maintained to restrict the use of military force, the at-
tempts of powerful countries to increase the possibilities of the use of force must 
remain futile. Otherwise, we would again be in the 19th century. 
Sažetak
Američka doktrina preventivnoga udara i međunarodno pravo
Ovaj se članak bavi opsegom američke doktrine preventivnoga napada. Pro-
učava zakonitost preventivnoga napada uopće, obilježja nove američke doktrine 
i njezin utjecaj na pozitivno međunarodno pravo.
13 See Gray, o.c., pp. 175-184 et seq.
14 See e.g. the Secretary General’s statement before the intervention at the press conference in the 
Hague on 10 March 2003, www.un.org/apps/news/infocusneqsiraq.asp?NewsID=421&sID=7 
and after the intervention. See e.g. a BBC News interview of 16 September 2004, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661640.stm.
Maja Seršić: THE AMERICAN PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE DOCTRINE...; 97-102
ADRIAS svezak 14, 2007.
102
Iako ne postoje naznake o novome običajnom pravu u vezi zakonitosti pre-
ventivnih napada, koje zagovara nova američka doktrina, akcije koje su poduzete 
u skladu s ovom doktrinom uglavnom su naštetile UN-u, koji je postao potpuno 
marginaliziran. U suštini, jedino UN ima nadležnost baviti se terorističkim prijet-
njama, jer samo organizacija koja obuhvaća (gotovo) sve svjetske države može 
reagirati na takve prijetnje na odgovarajući način.
Zabrana uporabe sile prema međunarodnome pravu – bez obzira na njezine 
povrede – jedno je od najvećih dostignuća civilizacije. Prihvaćanje nove američke 
teorije preventivnih napada dovelo bi do ukidanja današnje zabrane uporabe sile, 
što je nedopustivo. Ako se međunarodno pravo treba održati zato da bi ograničilo 
uporabu vojne sile, onda nastojanja jakih država da se povećaju mogućnosti upo-
rabe sile moraju ostati uzaludna, ili ćemo se inače ponovno naći u 19. stoljeću.
Ključne riječi: Samoobrana, preventivne akcije
